Agent access your risk team will actually approve.
Least-privilege, identity-attributed access to regulated data, with the evidence trail reviewers ask for.
What your customers are asking for
Your customers want their analysts and servicing teams to use assistants against real account data. Their second sentence is always about controls, because in this sector an unattributable action is a finding.
They are not asking whether AI is useful. They are asking who is accountable when it acts.
Why a shared API key fails
A shared API key makes every agent action indistinguishable from every other. The log says the integration did it, which is exactly the answer that fails an audit.
It also removes least privilege in one step: the key's scope becomes every user's scope, so a support user can reach what only an administrator should.
One request, followed all the way through
- 01A servicing analyst asks: "Show me the payment history on this account."
- 02The assistant calls get_payment_history carrying the analyst's session, not a credential.
- 03LockMCP verifies the session, checks the analyst's role against the tool, and confirms they may call it.
- 04The account parameter is scoped to the book that analyst is assigned, so accounts outside it cannot be requested.
- 05The call executes with credentials injected server-side, and sensitive response fields are redacted before the model sees them.
- 06The call, the arguments and the outcome are written to an append-only log against the analyst's identity.
What your customer gets
Least privilege enforced
Access is bounded by the signed-in user's role, checked when the tool runs.
Attributable actions
Every call names the person, not a service account.
Redaction before the model
Sensitive fields are stripped from responses automatically.
Revocation that works
Removing access is enough. There is no key left in a client config.
What you get
The questionnaire answered
Isolation, encryption, attribution and revocation each have a concrete answer.
Redaction you configure
Sensitive response fields are stripped before the assistant ever sees them.
No shared secrets to rotate
Clients never hold upstream credentials, so a leaked client config is not an incident.
Per-customer isolation
Row-level security scopes every query to the tenant that owns it.